How European public sector agencies innovate: The use of bottom-up, policy-dependent and knowledge-scanning innovation methods  by Arundel, Anthony et al.
Research Policy 44 (2015) 1271–1282
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Research Policy
journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate / respol
How European public sector agencies innovate: The use of bottom-up,
policy-dependent and knowledge-scanning innovation methods
Anthony Arundela,∗, Luca Casalib, Hugo Hollandersc
a Australian Innovation Research Centre at the University of Tasmania, Sandy Bay, Australia and UNU-MERIT at the University of Maastricht, Maastricht,
The Netherlands
b Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia
c UNU-MERIT at the University of Maastricht, Maastricht, The Netherlands
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 13 March 2014
Received in revised form 19 April 2015
Accepted 20 April 2015






a b s t r a c t
Factor and cluster analysis are used to identify different methods that public sector agencies in Europe
use to innovate, based on data from a 2010 survey of 3273 agencies. The analyses identify three types of
innovativeagencies:bottom-up, knowledge-scanning, andpolicy-dependent. Thedistributionofbottom-
up agencies across European countries is positively correlated with average per capita incomes while the
distribution of knowledge-scanning agencies is negatively correlated with income. In contrast, there is
no consistent pattern by country in the distribution of policy-dependent agencies. Regression results
that control for agency characteristics ﬁnd that innovation methods are signiﬁcantly correlated with the
beneﬁcial outcomes of innovation, with bottom-up and knowledge-scanning agencies out-performing
policy-dependent agencies.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The public sector contributes to between 20% and 30% of GDP in
economically developed countries (Eurostat, 2012). Given its eco-
nomic weight, there is growing policy interest in how to encourage
public sector innovation in order to improve productivity, the efﬁ-
ciency of service delivery and the quality of public services. This
interest has led to government support for surveys tomeasure pub-
lic sector innovation in the UK (Mulgan, 2007; Hughes et al., 2011),
Australia (Arundel andHuber, 2013), Scandinavia (BlochandBugge,
2013) and Europe (European Commission, 2011). Most of these
surveys have been inspired by the Oslo Manual’s (OECD/Eurostat,
2005) recommendations for measuring innovation in the private
sector, with questions on innovation inputs, activities and outputs.
The goal ofmeasuring public sector innovation is to informpoli-
cies to improve the innovation capacity andoutputs of agencies (for
simplicitywe replace ‘public sector organization’with ‘agency’). An
important step is to determine if there is heterogeneity in how
agencies innovate, as observed for the private sector in studies
using data from innovation surveys or speciﬁc innovations (Pavitt,
1984; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999; Leiponen and Drejer, 2007).
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 3 6226 7357.
E-mail address: anthony.arundel@utas.edu.au (A. Arundel).
If there is heterogeneity in the innovative capabilities of agencies,
there should be opportunities for learning which approaches to
innovation produce the best outcomes such as improvements to
service quality or process efﬁciencies.
An evaluation of differences in how agencies innovate depends
on how innovation is deﬁned. Major disruptive innovations such
as the introduction of national healthcare programs require politi-
cal legislation. Yet other types of disruptive innovations, such as
replacing mailed tax returns or government surveys with auto-
mated online versions may or may not depend on legislation
or directives. In addition, many incremental innovations such
as efﬁciency improvements to service delivery or administrative
processes could be developed and implemented at the agency
level. New governance structures were introduced in many devel-
oped countries from the 1980s to encourage managerial initiatives
to introduce efﬁciency-enhancing innovations and more recently
there has been interest in other forms of governance to encourage
innovation (Hartley et al., 2013).
In this article we use the results of a large survey of the inno-
vation activities of European public administration agencies to
determine if there are systematic differences in howagencies inno-
vate and the nature of these differences. The survey followed
the Oslo Manual in using a broad deﬁnition of innovation that
encompasses incremental innovations through to major disrup-
tive innovations, with innovation broadly deﬁned as ‘a new or
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.04.007
0048-7333/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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signiﬁcantly improved service, communication method, or pro-
cess/organizationalmethod’.Weevaluate three researchquestions.
First, are there differences in how agencies innovate and if yes,
how do these approaches vary? Second, do differences in how
agencies innovate vary in a consistent pattern across countries,
perhaps in response to different bureaucratic or cultural tradi-
tions? Our analyses for these ﬁrst two research questions identify
three different methods that agencies use to innovate: ‘bottom-
up’, ‘knowledge-scanning’, and ‘policy-dependent’ methods. The
prevalence of the ﬁrst two methods varies consistently across
European countries, while there is no consistent difference for
policy-dependent innovation. Of note, these analyses are largely
exploratory, due to the absence of a developed theory and previ-
ous research on heterogeneity in the innovative methods used by
agencies.
The third research question is if these three innovationmethods
are linked to innovation outputs or outcomes, such as the novelty of
innovations and the beneﬁts of innovation. The results indicate that
the ‘bottom-up’ and ‘knowledge-scanning’ methods are correlated
with better outcomes than the ‘policy-dependent’ approach. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst empirical study of the ﬁrst
and second researchquestions and theﬁrst study touse surveydata
for multiple countries to examine the link between how agencies
innovate and innovation outcomes.
2. Heterogeneity of the innovative activities of public
sector agencies
There are several reasons why we would expect agencies to
exhibit heterogeneity in their innovative activities, both within
countries and across countries. These include differences in gov-
ernance, cultural factors, and the discretionary power given to
managers.
The traditional governance structure for the public sector lim-
its innovation to a ‘top down’ process driven by political decisions
(Hartley, 2005;Walker, 2006), although seniormanagersmay have
some room to inﬂuence how legislated change or ministerial direc-
tives are implemented. Due to concerns that this approach stiﬂed
innovation, New Public Management (NPM) was introduced in
many countries in the 1980s to give managers greater responsibil-
ity for implementing efﬁciency-enhancing innovations, butHartley
et al. (2013) argue that NPMdiscouraged knowledge sharing across
organizations andconsequently acted tohinder some typesof inno-
vations. Failures with some of the main features of NPM, such
as splitting up government hierarchies, competition markets, and
incentive systems also encouraged the development of alternative
governance methods (Dunleavy et al., 2005; Moore and Hartley,
2008), such as ‘organizational entrepreneurship’ which encour-
ages ‘bottom up’ processes that involve both middle managers
and front-line staff in innovation, ‘whole of government’ or ‘joined
up government’ systems that stress collaboration across agencies,
and ‘lateral innovation’ where agencies adapt good practices in
use by other agencies (Hartley, 2005). Christensen and Laegreid
(2007) also identify methods in which agencies develop innova-
tions through ‘networked governance’ that includes collaboration
with both other agencies and non-governmental organizations.
Sorensen and Torﬁng (2012) refer to a new ‘governance network
method’ for public sector innovation that draws on the expertise of
front-line staff, managers, private businesses, users and others.
These different governance structures are likely to diffuse at
varying rates across countries. NPM was ﬁrst adopted by Anglo-
Saxon countries and later taken up to varying degrees by European
governments (Hartley et al., 2013). We would expect similar dif-
ferences in diffusion rates for methods based on organizational
entrepreneurship or lateral innovation.
2.1. Contextual factors: organization and culture
Contextual factors create the environment in which agency
managers operate (Walker, 2006). In addition to differences in gov-
ernance, there is some evidence that national differences in how
work is organized, the national culture, and organizational condi-
tions can inﬂuence how agencies innovate.
Research using the European 2000 Survey of Working Con-
ditions found large differences among 14 European Union (EU)
countries in the level of responsibility given to private-sector
employees (Arundel et al., 2007). In Sweden, Denmark and The
Netherlands over 50% of employees worked in ‘discretionary
learning’ organizations thatprovide staffwithhigh levels of respon-
sibility to solve problems,while inGreece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal
less than 30% of employees worked under these conditions, with
an above average share of employees working in Taylorist or tradi-
tional organizations where work is either routine or involves low
levels of problem solving. The study found a positive correlation
between the national share of employees working in discretionary
learning organizations and the share of highly innovative ﬁrms.
If working conditions in the public sector partly reﬂect condi-
tions in the private sector, we would expect higher shares of public
sector employees working in ‘discretionary learning’ agencies in
Scandinavia than in Southern Europe. These working conditions
could also support agency activities to develop innovations, as sug-
gested by the results for the private sector. Conversely, agencies
in Southern Europe could partly replicate the traditional organiza-
tional structures of their private sector counterparts, resulting in
fewer opportunities for employees to think of and suggest innova-
tive solutions of relevance to their workplace.
A related factor that could create national differences in how
agencies innovate is the national culture. Hofstede’s (2011) four
dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individual-
ism versus collectivism, and masculinity versus femininity have
been found to be correlated with several indicators of innova-
tion, such as per capita patent application rates at the EPO (Kaasa
and Vadi, 2010), the willingness of individuals to buy innovative
products (Steenkamp et al., 1999) and the innovative output of
ﬁrms (Rosenbusch et al., 2011). In general, innovation is nega-
tively correlated with power distance, uncertainty avoidance and
masculinity and positively correlated with individualism. A high
level of power distance, or a more hierarchical society, is expected
to reduce information sharing and consultation with employees,
high uncertainty avoidance to create fewer incentives for devel-
oping novel ideas, and high masculinity to reduce collaboration,
with these factors depressing innovative activity. Conversely, high
individualism is thought to support novelty-seeking behavior that
increases innovative activity. Societies with low power distance
and high individualism, such as in Northern Europe (Kaasa, 2013),
could also be more likely to have a higher percentage of work-
place environments that give employees greater responsibility to
develop innovative solutions to problems.
Other conditions that are common in the public sector could
impede innovation. Regulatory requirements could limit oppor-
tunities for innovation in the delivery of health, taxation or
security services (Borins, 2006; Mulgan and Albury, 2003; Koch
and Hauknes, 2005). In addition, strong bureaucracies and high
levels of red tape can create organizational cultures that are unre-
ceptive to innovation (Boyne, 2002), management aversion to
risk-taking (Osborne andBrown, 2011; Potts, 2009), or professional
and management resistance to change. In a study of 125 success-
ful innovations in Britain (NAO, 2006), the most frequently cited
barrier to innovation was a reluctance to ‘embrace new ways of
working’. Other impediments include ‘reputational’ and ‘techno-
logical’ risk which were frequently cited barriers in a study of
successful public sector innovations in the UK, Denmark, Finland
A. Arundel et al. / Research Policy 44 (2015) 1271–1282 1273
and Estonia (Pärna and von Tunzelmann, 2007). Concerns over
political ‘embarrassment’ or creating an opportunity for opposi-
tion party scrutiny and criticism (Koch and Hauknes, 2005; Mulgan
and Albury, 2003; Potts and Kastelle, 2010) could result in risk-
averse politicians limiting the discretionary freedom of managers
to innovate.
2.2. Discretionary innovation support strategies
Under some governance and contextual conditions, agency
managers could be able to implement strategies that encourage in-
house innovative capabilities, for instance by supporting the trial
and error testing of innovations or the evaluation of good ideas sug-
gested by staff (Boyne et al., 2005). Pärna and Tunzelmann (2007)
report that ‘personal leadership or committed key individuals’ was
the most important of 13 internal and 12 external factors support-
ing successful innovation in Denmark and Finland and one of the
leading factors in the UK and Estonia. A survey of Scandinavian
agencies similarly found thatmanagementwas themost important
of ten drivers for innovation (Bugge et al., 2011).
Techniques such as the use of incentives and evaluation systems
to encourage and sift through innovative ideas proposed by staff
could improve the likelihood of ‘bottom-up’ innovation, although
the effect of incentives on innovation has varied from no effect
in one study (Laegreid et al., 2011) to a positive effect in another
(Bysted and Jespersen, 2014).
Managers can also improve innovation by involving users in ser-
vice design (Kim, 2010) or by scanning activities to identify better
ways of doing things that are used by other agencies or businesses,
as suggested by Hartley’s (2005) concept of lateral innovation.
Relevant information can be obtained from sources within govern-
ment and from external sources, such as professional associations
(Damanpour and Schneider, 2006), businesses, and consultants.
There are no data at the agency level on the effect of differences
in governance structure on innovation, but research on the sources
of ideas for innovationsor the initiators of innovations suggests that
the majority of public sector innovations in high income countries
are proposed by managers and staff and not by politicians acting
through legislation or political directives. Borins’ (2001) study of
innovation award ﬁnalists in the United States found that only 20%
of the innovations were initiated by politicians versus 82% by mid-
dle management and 25% by front-line staff (multiple initiators per
innovation are possible). The greater importance of managers and
staff compared to political drivers as a source of ideas for innova-
tions has been replicated in innovation surveys in Australia (APSC,
2011; Arundel andHuber, 2013) and Scandinavia (Bloch andBugge,
2013).
The importance to public sector innovation of scanning exter-
nal sources for ideas and collaborating with a range of partners has
been identiﬁed in several studies. A UK study found that two-thirds
of local authoritiesbeneﬁted fromlearningabout innovations inuse
elsewhere (Audit Commission, 2007), while a survey of Australian
government workgroups found a positive correlation between the
number of idea sources drawn upon for an innovation and the
probability of major beneﬁts from the innovation (Torugsa and
Arundel, 2015). Pärna and von Tunzelmann’s (2007) study of 135
successful public sector innovations found that ‘good cooperation
with partners’ was the second most important factor in support-
ing successful innovation, after ‘personal leadership or committed
individuals’. The NAO (2006) survey found that 37.6% of 125 self-
reportedpublic sector innovations inBritain included collaboration
across agencies. Collaboration with external partners was noted as
an important supporting activity in the Scandinavian (Bloch and
Bugge, 2013) and Innobarometer surveys (European Commission,
2011). Borins’ (2012) research using innovation award ﬁnalists
found that the rate of cooperation has increased substantially over
time, from 29% of 217 ﬁnalists between 1990 and 1994 to 84% of
31 ﬁnalists between 2008 and 2009.
In summary, the literature suggests that a ‘top down’ gov-
ernance structure could be a common innovation method for
agencies, particularly in risk-averse environments orwhere there is
staff resistance to change. Bottom-up methods should be relatively
common in Northern Europe where work is more likely to be orga-
nized around discretionary learning than in Southern Europe and
reﬂect a pro-innovation culture. Newer approaches to innovation
suchas lateral andnetworked innovationcouldalsoexist. In respect
to beneﬁcial outcomes from innovation, it is impossible to pre-
dict the types of innovation methods that lead to better outcomes
because there has been very little research on this topic. However,
the literature provides a few suggestions for what might work,
including collaboration (Borins, 2012; Pärna and von Tunzelmann,
2007) and the use of external knowledge sources (Torugsa and
Arundel, 2015). The dominance of ‘bottom up’ innovations pro-
posed by managers and staff among award ﬁnalists in the United
States (Borins, 2001) suggests that this type of innovation could
also be correlated with successful outcomes, although the award
data are limited to a non-random selection of innovations and may
not be representative of most agencies.
3. Methodology
3.1. Data source
The data for this study are from the 2010 Innobarometer sur-
vey of innovation in European Public Administration Agencies. The
questionnaire was developed by two of the authors, the Euro-
pean Commission and Gallup Europe. Questionnaire translation
into national languages and implementation was managed by
Gallup Europe, with the survey in the ﬁeld in October 2010. Agen-
cies in NACE1 class 84.11 (general public administrative activities)
and NACE class 84.12 (regulation of the activities of providing
healthcare, education, cultural services and social services exclud-
ing social security) were randomly drawn from business registers.
These NACE classes exclude specialized service providers such as
educational institutions or hospitals, but include agencies such as
ministries of health or education that are responsible for deter-
mining how specialized services are provided and funded. As these
NACE categories can include private sector and non-proﬁt organi-
zations, a surveyquestion veriﬁed that the respondingorganization
was a government organization, with non-governmental organiza-
tions excluded from the analyses.
The survey used a quota sample with pre-selected numbers
of responses for each country, ranging from ten responses for
very small countries (Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta) to 400
for the larger countries (Germany, UK, France, Italy, Spain and
Poland), although the number of realized responses varied from
the expected number. In total, the survey obtained 3699 responses
from agencies with ten or more employees, of which 3384 (91.5%)
reported at least one innovation between January 2008 and the
time of the survey.
The target respondent was the agency head. The respon-
dent’s area of responsibility can vary signiﬁcantly, with responses
obtained from municipal, regional and national agencies. The
European Commission (2011) report provides furthermethodolog-
ical details and the survey questionnaire.2
1 The statistical classiﬁcation of economic activities in the European community,
commonly referred to as NACE, is the European industry classiﬁcation system.
2 The questionnaire is provided on pages 188–196 of the European Commission
(2011) report: http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/ﬂash/ﬂ 305 en.pdf.
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Table 1
Innovation methods: standardized factor scores for cluster centres and internal validity results.
1 2 3
Factor Bottom-up agencies Knowledge-scanning agencies Policy-dependent agencies Scheffé analyses: signif.
differences between clusters
Barriers −0.320 0.515 −0.232 1&3, 2&3
External knowledge sourcing −0.409 0.848 −0.533 1&2, 1&3, 2&3
Policy −0.172 −0.096 0.306 1&3, 2&3
Active management 0.760 0.031 −0.874 1&2, 1&3, 2&3
Support strategies 0.455 −0.224 −0.254 1&2, 1&3
Inter-rater reliability 0.99 0.98 0.98
Number of agencies 1,123 1,156 994
(34.3%) (35.3%) (30.4%)
3.2. Variables
The survey queried the characteristics of the agency (coun-
try of location, number of employees, function, and geographic
area served), three types of innovations (services, communication
methods, process/organizational methods), work force skills, and
innovation outcomes for service and process/organizational inno-
vations.
All 3384 agencies that reported an innovation were asked four
sets of questions on the importance of information sources, pol-
icy drivers, strategies and barriers to innovation, measured on a
Likert scale. These questions also included a ‘don’t know/not appli-
cable’ response option. If all agencies with at least one ‘don’t know’
response to one of the 25 questions of interest were excluded,
34.8% of innovative agencies would be lost to analysis. To conserve
responses, a ‘don’t know’ or ‘not applicable’ response is assumed
to be equivalent to a ‘not important’ response. The justiﬁcation is
that an important information source, strategy or policy driver is
likely to be remembered and relevant. There is one exception to this
rule. An agency that replied ‘don’t know’ to all sub-questions in a
group (for instance to all eight questions on information sources) is
excluded from the analyses because the respondent either refused
or was unable to answer any of the relevant questions. In total, 102
agencies (3%) were excluded for this reason, leaving 3282 agencies.
Quantitative outcome measures for agencies are difﬁcult to
obtain, as managers are rarely able to provide ﬁnancial data on the
effects of innovations. Consequently, the most common outcome
measures for agency surveys are customer (or user) satisfac-
tion or access to services, an increase or decrease in costs, and
improvements in quality characteristics (Hughes et al., 2011). The
Innobarometer survey asked about the major beneﬁts of innova-
tion on a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ basis: one question on ﬁve major positive
effects of service innovations, one question on four major positive
effects of process/organizational innovations, and one question on
four major negative effects of any of the three innovation types.
3.3. Analytical methods
We adopt a two-stage analysis. The ﬁrst stage identiﬁes dif-
ferent approaches to innovation (innovation methods), while the
second stage uses regression analysis to determine if the methods
are correlated with innovation outcomes.
The ﬁrst stage follows de Jong and Marsili (2006) and Leiponen
and Drejer (2007) by using a three-step exploratory analysis that
uses principal component analysis to reduce the number of vari-
ables, cluster analysis to assign agencies to discrete clusters on the
basis of their factor scores, and validation analysis that uses ques-
tions that were not included in the factor analysis to determine
if there are other statistically signiﬁcant differences between the
identiﬁed clusters.
The number of factors to extract from the principal component
analysis was based on Kaiser’s criteria, which identiﬁed ﬁve factors
with eigenvalues greater than 1. These ﬁve factors explain 48.5%
of the variance. All diagnostics are acceptable, with no evidence of
multicollinearity problems (no correlations between the variables
are over 0.9 and the determinant for all correlations is 0.003, well
above the necessary value of 0.00001). The sample size is goodwith
a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy of 0.866 for
all variables combined and above 0.725 for all individual variables.
As cluster analysis is very sensitive to outliers, nine agencies
with at least one factor score with a standard deviation greater
than or equal to 3 were excluded, reducing the number of cases
to 3273. The cluster analysis uses the K-means cluster procedure
suitable for a large numbers of cases. Two-, three- and four-cluster
solutionswere examined,with the three-cluster solutionproviding
the most interpretable results.
3.3.1. Regressions
Regression models are used to identify agency characteristics
that are correlated with each innovation method and to evaluate
the relationship between these methods and innovation out-
comes. Logit regressions are used for the evaluation of agency
characteristics. A multivariate probit model is used for the out-
come analyses because the outcomes are correlated with each
other, possibly due to the structure of the relevant question,
which lists each outcome consecutively. The estimation uses the
Geweke–Hajivassiliou–Keane maximum likelihood and simul-
taneously models the effect of the set of explanatory variables
on each of the dependent variables, while controlling for mutual
correlations between their error terms. Failing to control for sig-
niﬁcant correlations can lead to biased estimation of parameters
(Amara et al., 2008).
4. Results for the factor and cluster analyses
The principal component analysis identiﬁes ﬁve factors: inno-
vation barriers, external knowledge sourcing, policy drivers, active
management involvement and innovation support strategies. The
best results were for a three-cluster solution for the ﬁve factors, as
shown in Table 1. The ﬁrst cluster, labelled ‘bottom-up’ agencies,
has negative scores for the barrier, external knowledge sources and
policy factors, but the highest average scores for active manage-
ment involvement and innovation support strategies, both relevant
to the in-house ability of agencies to innovate. The second cluster,
‘knowledge-scanning’ agencies has high factor scores for external
knowledge sources and low or negative scores for policy drivers,
active management, and support strategies. Of interest, this is the
only cluster with a positive score for barriers, suggesting that these
agencies respond to barriers by searching for solutions from exter-
nal sources. The third cluster, ‘policy-dependent’ agencies, has the
highest score for policy drivers and negative scores for all other
factors. Thenumberof agenciesper cluster is very similar at approx-
imately one-third each.
Internal cluster validity was examined using a within-group
inter-rater reliability test (James et al., 1984) for the degree of
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Table 2
Percent of agencies giving a high score to each variable used in the factor analysis.
Bottom-up Knowledge-scanning Policy-dependent Average
Information sources for innovation (percent ‘very important’ responses)
AM Ideas from management 60.8a 61.4a 21.9 49.2
Ideas from staff 53.9a 56.6a 21.1 44.9
KS Best practice examples of other governments 34.5 49.4 15.3 33.9
KS Professional organizations 14.6 32.8 4.7 18.0
KS Visits to conferences 12.6 36.1 9.6 20.0
KS Enterprises as suppliers 4.8 c 30.0 3.7 c 13.4
KS Enterprises as clients 11.4 41.1 5.5 20.1
KS Citizens as clients or users 37.2 70.5 29.2 46.5
Policy drivers for innovation (percent ‘very important’ responses)
P Mandated decrease in budget 35.9a 38.9a,b 42.3b 38.9
P Mandated increase in budget 14.1 26.0b 27.2b 22.3
P New laws or regulations 46.0a 50.0a,b 53.0b 49.6
P New policy priorities 40.5a 40.8a 36.1 39.3
P Mandated introduction of new e-gov/online services 35.6 50.7 40.6 42.5
Strategies to support innovation (percent ‘fully implemented’ responses)
AM Managers support trial and error testing of new ideas 48.7 22.1 2.4 25.3
AM Managers take an active role in innovation 80.4 44.2 14.3 47.5
SS Staff incentives for new idea development 49.9 20.4b 17.5b 29.6
SS Users involved in design/planning of innovative services 40.0 22.5 14.5 14.5
SS New or improved services evaluated after completion 61.8 45.2 28.6 45.8
Barriers to innovation (percent ‘very important’ responses)
B Lack of management support 18.6c 47.9 17.7c 28.7
B Lack of incentives for your staff 14.7c 40.1 17.7c 24.6
B Staff resistance 13.4c 35.0 12.1c 20.6
B Uncertain acceptance by the users of your services 12.5c 31.5 11.2c 18.8
B Regulatory requirements 30.7c 50.5 33.0c 38.4
B Lack of sufﬁcient human or ﬁnancial resources 45.8 63.8 54.2 54.7
B Risk-averse culture in your organization 15.5c 29.7 13.2c 19.8
Notes: Statistical signiﬁcance is calculated using X2 for the full range of categorical responses for each variable. All variables differ signiﬁcantly across all three methods
(p<0.001). The superscripts identify a lack of statistical signiﬁcance for pairs of innovation methods. The superscript ‘a’ indicates no signiﬁcant difference (p>0.05) between
bottom-up and knowledge-scanning agencies, ‘b’ indicates no signiﬁcant difference between knowledge-scanning and policy-dependent agencies, and ‘c’ indicates no
signiﬁcant difference between bottom-up and policy-dependent agencies. Otherwise all pairwise differences are signiﬁcant with p<0.001 with the following exceptions:
betweenbottom-upandpolicy-dependent agencies for ‘visits to conferences’ (p=0.027); betweenexternal knowledgeandpolicyagencies for ‘newpolicypriorities’ (p=0.026),
and between bottom-up and policy-dependent agencies for ‘new policy priorities’ (p=0.040).
agreementwithin eachmethod for the ﬁve factors in Table 1 (Alexy
and Reitzig, 2013). MANOVA shows that the three methods differ
signiﬁcantly (F=848.9, p<0.001). Scheffé analyses of the differ-
ences by factor bymethod are given in Table 1. There are signiﬁcant
differences betweenmethods 1 and3 for all factors, betweenmeth-
ods 1 and 2 except for the barriers and policy factors, and between
methods 2 and 3 for all factors except for support strategies. The
results of the inter-rater reliability test were close to 1 for each
cluster, indicating strong within-cluster level of agreement.
Due to space limitations we do not provide a table of the fac-
tor loadings. Instead, Table 2 provides the percentage of agencies
by cluster that give a high importance rating to each of the 25
questions used in the factor analysis, as this provides a better pic-
ture of the differences between clusters.3 The variables associated
with each of the ﬁve factors are identiﬁed through abbreviations to
the left of each variable (AM=active management, KS =knowledge
sourcing, P =policy, SS = support strategies, and B=barriers). One
of the variables, ‘ideas from staff’, lacked sufﬁcient variation in the
factor loadings to be assigned to any of the ﬁve factors, with sim-
ilar loadings for the external knowledge and active management
factors.
As expected, there are statistically signiﬁcant differences
between the three innovation methods for all 25 variables
(p<0.001). The highest statistically signiﬁcant scores are marked
in bold. The bottom-up agencies have the highest share of agencies
that give a ‘high’ importance to active management and innova-
tion support strategies. The knowledge-scanning agencies have the
3 The factor loadings are available from the corresponding author on request.
highest share of agencies that give a ‘high’ importance to external
knowledge sources andbarrier variables. The interpretation ismore
nuanced for the policy-dependent agencies and explains why this
group is labelled ‘policy dependent’ instead of following Mulgan
and Albury (2003) or Hartley (2005) in describing these agencies
as ‘top down’ innovators. With only a few exceptions, the policy-
dependent cluster has considerably lower than average shares of
agencies that give a ‘high’ importance to activemanagement, exter-
nal knowledge, support strategies and barrier variables. However,
the shares are only slightly higher than the average for three of the
policy variables and slightly below the average for two of the policy
variables. The cluster analysis assigns these agencies to the same
group because policy variables are the only distinguishing factor
for these agencies. The label ‘policy dependent’ indicates that these
agencies are dependent on policy to innovate and largely lack other
methods for identifying or developing innovations.
4.1. Differences in internal innovation capabilities
The questionnaire collected data on two agency characteristics
that could inﬂuence innovation capabilities, but which were not
used in the factor analysis: internal activities to support innovation
and activities to support information gathering.
The support strategies consist of the share of employees
involved in groups that meet regularly to develop innovations
and the share of agencies that provide training speciﬁcally for
implementing, using or providing new or improved innovations.
Policy-dependent agencies are more likely to report that none of
their employees are involved in groups (30.2% versus 11.1% for
knowledge-scanning and 11.8% for bottom-up agencies, p<0.000).
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Table 3
Innovation method by collaboration with external ﬁrms and obtaining information from distant sources.
Bottom-up agencies Knowledge-scanning agencies Policy-dependent agencies Total
Share of agencies that developed innovations through collaboration with external organizations1
Services
Other public sector organizations 62.7% 67.4% 55.3% 62.5%
Private businesses 42.7% 46.7% 32.3% 41.4%
Not-for-proﬁt organizations 37.8% 41.3% 25.9% 35.9%
Processes/organizational methods
Other public sector organizations 58.9% 59.9% 43.0% 54.7%
Private businesses 40.8% 42.3% 30.7% 38.4%
Not-for-proﬁt organizations 29.1% 33.5% 19.5% 28.0%
Share of agencies that obtained essential information for innovation from increasingly distant sources2
None (no essential information obtained) 27.9% 25.4% 41.0% 30.6%
Organization in their country 46.9% 44.8% 45.4% 45.7%
Organization in another EU country or outside the EU 25.2% 29.8% 13.6% 25.8%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
1 Results limited to agencies that reported each type of innovation. All differences by innovation method in comparison to policy-dependent innovators are statistically
signiﬁcant with p<0.05. The only signiﬁcant difference between bottom-up innovators and knowledge-scanning innovators is for services for private businesses.
2 All differences by innovation method in comparison to policy-dependent innovators are statistically signiﬁcant with p<0.000, but the differences between bottom-up
and knowledge-scanning innovators are not statistically signiﬁcant.
In addition, fewer policy-dependent agencies provide training
for innovation: 61.1% of policy-dependent agencies with pro-
cess/organizational innovations provide training for this type of
innovation, versus 76.3% of bottom-up and 78.3% of knowledge-
scanning agencies. (p<0.001).
Table 3 provides results for information gathering. The ﬁrst
section gives the share of agencies by innovation method that
collaborated on service and process/organizational innovations
with three types of collaboration partners. For both types of
innovations, knowledge-scanning agencies had the highest and
policy-dependent agencies the lowest collaboration rate. The sec-
ond section of Table 3 gives the percentage of agencies that
‘obtained information essential to your innovations’ from national
sources or from an organization in a different country. The percent-
ages are based on the farthest information source. For example,
agencies that obtained essential information from both within and
outside their country are assigned to the latter category.We expect
knowledge-scanning agencies to be more likely to source essential
information from external sources located at a distance. The results
show that 29.8% of these agencies obtained essential information
from sources located outside their country compared to 25.2%
of bottom-up agencies and 13.6% of policy-dependent agencies.
Furthermore, 41.0% of policy-dependent agencies did not obtain
any essential information from external sources, compared to only
25.4% of knowledge-scanning agencies.
In summary, the external validation results show that there are
signiﬁcant differences between policy-dependent agencies and the
other two innovation methods. Policy-dependent agencies have
the lowest use of innovation groups, rates of provision of training
for innovation, collaboration activities and sourcing information
outside their country. However, the differences are much smaller
between knowledge-scanning and bottom-up agencies.
5. Contextual factors: agency and national factors
National differences in the prevalence of each innovation
method could occur if the public sector replicates observed differ-
ences in the organizational structure of private ﬁrms, if Hofstede’s
measures of national culture inﬂuence the attitudes of managers
and staff to innovation, or if differences in per capita incomes affect
the ﬁnancial resources available to agencies for innovation. In addi-
tion, the agency size, function and geographic area of responsibility
could also inﬂuence the innovation method. All are contextual fac-
tors that shape the environment in which innovation occurs.
Preliminary analyses grouped agencies by three European
regions: Northern developed countries, Mediterranean countries,
and developing and transition countries. In contrast to expecta-
tions that policy-dependent methods would be more common in
the Mediterranean countries, the share of policy-dependent agen-
cies in each region varied by less than two percentage points from
the average of 30.4%.
The national share of each innovation method in 26 European
countries for which there were more than 10 respondents was cor-
related with each of Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions and with
Kaasa’s (2013) combined index for an innovative culture based on
high values for individualism and low values for power distance,
uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. Kaasa’s (2013) data are
from the European values study of 2008 and therefore comparable
to the time period of 2008 to late 2010 covered by the Innobarom-
eter survey. The shares for 14 European countries were correlated
with Arundel et al. (2007) data for the share of employed persons
whose jobs displayed the characteristics of a discretionary learning,
lean production or Taylorist workplace.
None of the cultural dimensions or workplace organization fac-
tors was correlated with the national share of policy-dependent
agencies. The most consistent results were for the national share
of bottom-up agencies, which was positively correlated with
Kaasa’s innovation culture index (R2 =0.53, p<0.000), with the
largest effect due to a negative correlation with power distance
(R2 =0.37, p=0.002) and a positive correlation with individualism
(R2 =0.41, p<0.000). The correlations with uncertainty avoidance
and masculinity were also negative and signiﬁcant, but with R2
values of 0.15 and 0.16, respectively. The correlation between
bottom-up agencies and the national share of employees working
in discretionary learning organizations was positive and signiﬁ-
cant (R2 =0.30, p=0.043) and negative for Taylorism (R2 =−0.38,
p=0.022).
The correlations for the share of knowledge-scanning agencies
produced lower R2 values, but they were consistently the opposite
sign of those for the share of bottom up agencies. For example, the
R2 for discretionary learning was −0.426 (p=0.011).
Hofstede (2011) noted that two cultural dimensions, individ-
ualism and a small power distance, are signiﬁcantly correlated
with per capita GDP. Since these two dimensions are the main
factors explaining the correlation between Kaasa’s innovation
culture index and the national share of bottom-up agencies,
we correlated per capita GDP with the cultural index. The
correlation coefﬁcient is considerably higher than all others, with
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50–99 0.435** 0.450** 0.041
100–249 0.599*** 0.523** 0.109
250–499 1.051*** 1.378*** −0.204
500–999 0.664** 0.967*** −0.299
1000+ 1.191*** 1.460*** −0.115
Geo responsibility: national2 1.053*** 0.559* 0.468**
Geo responsibility: regional2 0.343* 0.407** −0.172
General government agency3 −0.291** −0.085 −0.194*
National average per capita income (PPS) 0.007*** −0.017*** 0.020***
Constant 0.341 2.83*** −1.826***
Number of agencies 2117 2136 2270
Nagelkerke R2 0.115 0.113 0.097
Percent correctly classiﬁed 63.0% 64.3% 64.3%
* =p<0.05, ** =p<0.01, *** =p<0.001.
1 Reference category is 10–49 employees.
2 Reference category is local agencies.
3 Reference category is agencies with speciﬁc responsibilities only (education, health, housing, environment, etc).
an R2 of 0.80 (p<0.001). The R2 coefﬁcient for the correlation
between the national share of bottom-up agencies and income is
0.504 (p<0.01), which is very similar to the R2 of 0.53 for Kaasa’s
innovation culture index. Conversely, the correlation between
income and the share of knowledge-scanning agencies is negative,
with an R2 of −0.285 (p<0.005). There is no relationship between
income and the national share of policy-dependent agencies.
These results suggest that cultural or income differences
between countries could partly explain differences in how agen-
cies innovate. Since the results are very similar ifweuse the cultural
innovation index or income, we use the latter as a measure of the
resources available to agencies to support innovation, but it also
serves as a proxy for cultural differences.
How private ﬁrms innovate is strongly inﬂuenced by their sec-
tor of activity (Pavitt, 1984; de Jong and Marsili, 2006). The closest
equivalent to a sector for public agencies is their main function.
The Innobarometer survey asked respondents if their agency was
responsible for seven functional areas, including ‘general gov-
ernment activities or ﬁnance’, education, health, social services,
‘culture, sport or recreation’, housing, or the environment. Unfor-
tunately, the question asked respondents to select up to three
functions, which makes it impossible to identify speciﬁc functions.
We therefore only differentiate between respondents that cited
‘general government activities or ﬁnance’ and respondents that
only cited a specialized function, such as education or health. A
signiﬁcantly higher share (p<0.001) of policy-dependent agencies
(66.6%) are responsible for general government activities compared
to knowledge-scanning (61.1%) and bottom-up agencies (58.1%).
The majority of agencies serve local areas (73.5% of bottom-
up, 77.5% of knowledge-scanning, and 85.4% of policy-dependent
agencies) and have fewer than 100 employees (53.9% of bottom-
up, 61.1% of knowledge-scanning and 75.6% of policy-dependent
agencies).
Table 4 gives regression results for the relationship between
contextual factors and innovation methods. Larger agencies are
more likely to use bottom-up or knowledge-scanning methods
than policy-dependent methods. In addition, agencies that serve
national or regional areas are more likely to use bottom-up or
knowledge-scanning methods than agencies that serve local areas.
An increase in the average per capita income of the country
increases the probability that the agency is a bottom-up inno-
vator; whereas, it decreases the probability that the agency is
a knowledge-scanning innovator. General function agencies are
less likely to use bottom-up methods, while there is no signiﬁ-
cant difference for this variable between knowledge-scanning and
policy-dependent agencies. As shown in the last column, there are
no signiﬁcant differences in the size of bottom-up and knowledge-
scanning agencies, but bottom-up agencies are more likely to serve
the nation, are less likely to have general government functions,
and more likely to have higher national per capita incomes.
6. Results for innovation outputs and outcomes
Given policy interest in improving public sector performance,
an important question is if the innovation method is correlated
with innovation outputs such as the novelty of innovations and
outcomes such as negative and positive effects of service and pro-
cess/organizational innovations.
Foroutputs, Table5gives results for twonoveltymeasures: if the
agency reported a ‘country-ﬁrst’ service innovation and if over half
of agency services were new or had been signiﬁcantly improved in
the previous two years. The questions were only asked of agencies
with service innovations because this type of innovation is pub-
licly visible and therefore respondents are more likely to know
how their services compare to those of other agencies. The best
performance for both novelty measures is for knowledge-scanning
agencies,with thepoorest performance forpolicy-dependent agen-
cies.
For outcomes, respondents were asked if any of their service,
process or communication innovations introduced since January
2008 resulted in four types of major negative effects, ﬁve major
beneﬁts from service innovations, and four major beneﬁts from
Table 5
Innovation novelty by innovation method.1
Bottom-up agencies Knowledge-scanning agencies Policy-dependent agencies
Introduced a new service before other agencies in your country 31.9% 36.6% 16.7%
50% or more of services are new or signiﬁcantly improved since January 2008 11.4% 14.2% 7.3%
1 Limited to agencies that introduced an innovative service. All differences by innovation method are statistically signiﬁcant (p<0.05).
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Table 6
Percentage of agencies that report positive effects from service and process/organizational innovations introduced in the previous two years.
Bottom-up agencies Knowledge-scanning agencies Policy-dependent agencies
Service innovations1
Offer services to more or new types of users 61.4% 63.8% *51.2%
Better targeting of services 73.9% 69.7% *56.6%
Improved user satisfaction 78.5% 76.8% 74.3%
Improved user access to information 82.2% 83.9% *76.5%
Faster delivery of services 70.5% 71.6% *58.7%
No positive effect reported 1.3% 1.3% *4.0%
Process/organizational innovations2
Simpliﬁed administrative procedures 71.5% 68.6% *60.0%
Reduced costs for providing services 58.5% 56.8% *41.7%
Enable faster delivery of services 69.0% 70.9% *58.6%
Improved employee satisfaction or working conditions 68.6% 66.3% *55.1%
No positive effect reported 2.9% 2.7% *7.7%
*p<0.05.
* = statistically signiﬁcant (p< compared to bottom-up and knowledge-sourcing agencies.
1 Limited to agencies that introduced at least one service innovation.
2 Limited to agencies that introduced at least one process or organizational innovation.
process/organizational innovations. With one exception, there are
no signiﬁcant differences for each of four negative effects, with
little difference from the averages of 17.4% reporting major neg-
ative effects from ‘creating additional administrative costs’, 7.1%
reporting ‘reducing the types or ﬂexibility of your services’ and4.4%
reporting ‘leading to slower delivery of services’. The exception is
a lower percentage of policy-dependent agencies reporting ‘user
resistance or dissatisfaction’ (10.2% versus the average of 13.6%,
p=0.01).
Table 6 gives the percentage of agencies that report major
positive effects of service innovations and process/organizational
innovations. Positive beneﬁts are reported by over 50% of each type
of agency. A signiﬁcantly lower percentage of policy-dependent
agencies report positive effects for four of the ﬁve outcomes of
service innovations and for all four outcomes of process/
organizational innovations.
For all three innovationmethods, the least commonly cited pos-
itive beneﬁt is ‘reduced costs for providing services’ as a result of
process innovations. For instance, only 41.7% of policy-dependent
agencies report reduced costs as a positive outcome, compared to
60.0% that report ‘simpliﬁed administrative procedures’. Since the
survey referenceperiod covers2008until theendof2010, therefore
including the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2009, a possible expectation
is that government austeritymeasuresmighthave increasedefforts
to reduce costs. However, Eurostat (2015) data on general gov-
ernment ﬁnal consumption expenditures (GFCE), which exclude
transferpayments for socialwelfare, showthat totalGFCE increased
between2008and2010 in themajority of Europeanmember states.
Table 7
Multivariate probit results for positive beneﬁts from service innovations.1










B B B B B
Agency employees2
50–99 −0.017 0.082 0.317** 0.206* 0.160
100–249 −0.132 0.025 0.150 0.314** 0.172
250–499 0.138 0.268** 0.146 0.126 0.467***
500–999 0.032 0.316** 0.223 0.510*** 0.553***
1000+ 0.328** 0.379*** 0.277 0.456*** 0.713***
Geo responsibility: regional3 −0.049 −0.079 −0.081 −0.045 0.012
Geo responsibility: national3 0.134 0.008 −0.239** −0.053 0.111
General government agency4 −0.012 −0.038 −0.012 0.047 −0.002
Training for innovation5 0.310*** 0.452*** 0.309*** 0.255** 0.389***
Innovation groups6 0.166*** 0.388*** 0.314** 0.171 0.196*
National per capita income7 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.004** 0.000
Bottom-up innovator8 0.125 0.253*** −0.043 0.030 0.119
Knowledge-scanning innovator8 0.274*** 0.276*** 0.034 0.200** 0.214**
Constant −0.671 −0.968 −0.339 −0.018 −0.222
Correlation (error terms)
Better targeting 0.446***
User satisfaction 0.327*** 0.451***
Information access 0.382*** 0.411*** 0.389***
Faster delivery 0.322*** 0.485*** 0.401*** 0.477***
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
1 Limited to 2416 agencies reporting the introduction of a service innovation.
2 Reference category is 10–49 employees.
3 Reference category is local agencies.
4 Reference category is agencies with speciﬁc responsibilities only (education, health, housing, environment, etc).
5 50% or more of employees participate in groups that meet regularly to develop new or signiﬁcantly improved innovations.
6 Training speciﬁcally for implementing, using or providing new or improved services.
7 Purchasing power standards (PPS) for 2010.
8 Reference category is policy-dependent innovators.
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Table 8







Improve employee satisfaction or
working conditions
B B B B
Agency employees2
50–99 0.017 −0.062 0.157* −0.069
100–249 0.242** 0.036 −0.005 −0.188*
250–499 0.290** 0.275** 0.192* −0.071
500–999 0.356** 0.327** 0.342** −0.019
1000+ 0.406*** 0.541*** 0.285** −0.178
Geo responsibility: regional3 0.054 −0.022 −0.025 −0.027
Geo responsibility: national3 −0.036 0.118 −0.031 −0.112
General government agency4 0.061 −0.117* 0.146** −0.091
Training for innovation5 0.217*** 0.166** 0.309*** 0.212***
Innovation groups6 0.180* 0.132 0.022 0.226**
National per capita income7 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.007***
Variety of innovations 0.165*** 0.194*** 0.227*** 0.173***
Bottom-up innovator8 0.050 0.170** 0.052 0.173**
Knowledge-scanning innovator8 0.062 0.161* 0.078 0.161*
Constant −1.161 −1.206*** −1.305*** −0.983
Correlation (error terms)
Reduce costs of providing services 0.349***
Faster delivery 0.321*** 0.317***
Improve employee satisfaction 0.290*** 0.211*** 0.271***
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001.
1–8See Table 7 for notes.
The UK is the only large country which recorded a fall in GFCE
over these three years, along with seven smaller economies (Bul-
garia, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Romania).
Austerity did not take hold in other countries such as Italy, Spain,
Portugal and Greece until 2011. This might explain why ‘reducing
costs’ was not the most widely cited beneﬁt of process innovation
over 2008–2010.
6.1. Regression results for major innovation beneﬁts
Tables 7 and 8 provide regression results for the beneﬁcial
effects of service and process/organizational innovation by type of
agency while controlling for contextual factors and for two addi-
tional innovation support strategies: the provision of training for
innovation and if 50% or more of employees are involved in regular
group meetings to develop innovations. The reference category for
agency type is policy-dependent agencies.
The probability of obtaining at least one positive outcome is
likely to increase with the number of innovations. The data lack
an innovation count measure, but agency size is included to con-
trol for the number of innovations. Another factor is the variety of
innovations, with different types of innovations creating different
opportunities for speciﬁc beneﬁts. Although the questionnaire only
asks about service innovations in general, the survey asks about
ﬁve types of process/organizational innovations.4 This information
is used to construct a variable for innovation variety that equals the
sum of ‘yes’ responses to the ﬁve types of process/organizational
innovations. Policy-dependent agencies report less variety for
their process/organizational innovations: an average of 2.5 types
compared to 3.1 for bottom-up and 3.4 for knowledge-scanning
agencies.
4 The ﬁve types are new or improved (1) methods of providing services or inter-
acting with your users, (2) improved delivery or logistics systems for your inputs,
(3) supporting activities such as maintenance systems, purchasing, accounting or
computing systems, (4) management systems, and (5) methods of organizing work
responsibilities or decision making.
6.1.1. Control variables
Agency size has a signiﬁcant positive effect for all ﬁve of the
beneﬁts from service innovations (see Table 7) and for three of
the four beneﬁts from process innovations (see Table 8). The geo-
graphic area of responsibility has no effect on reported beneﬁts
for both types of innovations, except for ‘improved user satisfac-
tion’ where national agencies are less likely than local agencies to
report this beneﬁt. The agency function has no effect on beneﬁts
from service innovations, but general government agencies are less
likely than specialized agencies to report reduced costs and more
likely to report faster delivery of services for process/organizational
innovations.
The use of training and innovation groups is likely to result in
innovation beneﬁts by improving efﬁciency and ensuring that the
innovation is a success. As expected, both strategies have a signiﬁ-
cant positive effect on most of the nine beneﬁcial outcomes.
The average national per capita income (also a proxy for a pro-
innovation culture) has a signiﬁcant positive effect for seven of the
nine outcomes, suggesting that higher income and pro-innovation
countries are better able to extract beneﬁts frompublic sector inno-
vation.
Of note, the variable for the variety of process/organizational
innovations is statistically signiﬁcant and positive in all regressions
in Table 8.
6.1.2. Innovation method
Both knowledge-scanning and bottom-up agencies are signif-
icantly more likely to report positive beneﬁts from innovation
than policy-dependent agencies, as shown in Tables 7 and 8.
Knowledge-scanning agencies are more likely to report positive
results for four of theﬁvebeneﬁts of service innovations (the excep-
tion is ‘improved user satisfaction’) and for two of the positive
effects from process/organizational innovations (‘reduce costs of
providing services’ and ‘improve employee satisfaction or work-
ing conditions’). Bottom-up agencies only have an advantage for
one beneﬁt from service innovations (‘better targeting of services’)
and for the same two beneﬁts of process/organizational inno-
vation as for knowledge-scanning agencies. As the variables for
bottom-up and knowledge-scanning agencies are both measured
on a binary scale, their coefﬁcients are directly comparable. The
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largest difference between bottom-up and knowledge-scanning
agencies is for ‘improved user access to information’ from ser-
vice innovations, where the coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcantly different
from zero for bottom-up agencies versus 0.20 and signiﬁcant for
knowledge-scanning agencies. This could be due to the consider-
ably higher share of knowledge-scanning agencies that give high
importance to citizens as an information source (70.5% versus
37.2% for bottom-up agencies, see Table 2). This activity could pro-
vide knowledge-scanning agencieswith better information on user
requirements.
7. Discussion and conclusions
This study applied factor and cluster analysis to the results of
a 2010 survey of 3273 public sector agencies across 27 EU coun-
tries. As observed for the private sector (Pavitt, 1984; de Jong and
Marsili, 2006), the results ﬁndmeaningful differences inhowpublic
agencies innovate, with agencies using policy-dependent, bottom-
up and knowledge-scanning innovation methods. These categories
partly support theoretical research into how public agencies might
innovate.
Policy-dependent agencies, accounting for 30.4% of the total,
innovate in response to politicallymandated changes in the agency
budget, new laws or regulations, new policy priorities, or the man-
dated introduction of new services. This method is in line with
traditional perceptions of how a public agency innovates, with
decisions taken by elected politicians. Compared to the two other
methods, these agencies are less likely to collaborate on the devel-
opment of an innovation with external organizations or to obtain
information for innovation from external sources. Signiﬁcantly
fewer policy-dependent agencies actively encourage staff partic-
ipation in innovation through work groups to develop innovations
or through training to assist with the implementation of innova-
tions. The poor development of in-house innovative capabilities
could partly explain why fewer policy-dependent agencies intro-
duced a novel service innovation before other agencies in their
country.
Contextual factors could also explain why policy-dependent
agencies are less innovative than agencies displaying the charac-
teristics of the other two approaches to innovation. Regression
analysis shows that they are signiﬁcantly smaller than the other
two types of agencies and a higher percentage serve local areas
versus regional or national areas. These factors could limit the
awareness of politicians of relevant innovations that have been
implemented by other agencies. However, in contrast to expec-
tations, policy-dependent agencies are not more common in
European countries characterized by hierarchical organizational
structures in the private sector.
Bottom-up agencies, accounting for 34.3% of the total, have
active management support for innovation and have implemented
several strategies to encourage the development of innovative
ideas. These include incentive programs for staff, support for trial
and error testing, and methods to evaluate new services. Bottom-
up agencies have several of the characteristics of ‘organizational
entrepreneurship’ described by Moore and Hartley (2008), where
managers have the discretionary ability to invest in strategies to
support the development of ideas proposed by staff and middle
management. They are also the largest agencies in termsof employ-
ment and are more likely to serve the national government. Their
greater prevalence in the higher income countries of Northern
Europe is in line with research that ﬁnd high rates of innovations
proposed by managers and staff in high income countries such
as the United States (Borins, 2001), Australia (Arundel and Huber,
2013) and Scandinavia (Bloch and Bugge, 2013).
Knowledge-scanning accounts for 35.3% of the agencies. These
agencies seek to overcome innovation barriers by drawing on
external sources for good ideas, such as enterprises as clients
or suppliers, users of agency services, visits to conferences, pro-
fessional organizations, and best practice experiences of other
governments. Knowledge-scanning agencies use some of the same
innovation support methods as bottom-up agencies, although
slightly more offer training, collaborate with external organiza-
tions, and obtain essential knowledge for their innovative activities
from organizations outside their country. The national share of
knowledge-scanning agencies is negatively correlated with per
capita income,with the highest share in the poorer transition coun-
tries of the European Union. The knowledge-scanning agencies
exhibit some of the characteristics of Hartley’s (2005) concept of
lateral innovators.
The analyses do not identify the type of ‘networked’ agency
proposed by Sorensen and Torﬁng (2012) that draws on both
internal resources and external sources for its innovations.
As shown in Table 2, considerably fewer bottom-up versus
knowledge-scanning agencies give high importance to six external
knowledge sources, while considerably more bottom-up agencies
have fully-implemented several methods to support innovation.
One explanation is the greater importance of barriers such as
staff resistance and a lack of resources and management support
among knowledge-scanning agencies. This could possibly be due to
cultural factors such as lower individualism and higher power dis-
tance than for bottom-up agencies, or to lower average per capita
incomes resulting in limited ﬁnancial resources. These problems
could force the managers of knowledge-scanning agencies to seek
good ideas outside their agency. Yet there is one area of similarity
between bottom-up and knowledge-scanning agencies. As shown
in Table 3, both bottom-up and knowledge-scanning agencies have
similar rates of developing innovations through collaboration with
other organizations. This supports the current emphasis in the
management literature on the value of innovating through col-
laboration (Borins, 2012; Christensen and Laegreid, 2007; Hartley,
2005).
The positive correlation between high per capita national
incomes and the share of bottom-up agencies and low per capita
incomes (predominantly in the transition economies of Europe)
and the share of knowledge-scanning agencies suggest another fac-
tor that could partly explain the differences between bottom-up
and knowledge-scanning agencies. Knowledge-scanning agencies
in resource-constrained lower income countries could be imitat-
ing, at low cost, the best-practices of more developed countries.
In contrast, agencies in high-income countries could be innovat-
ing at the frontier of public sector innovations and consequently
ﬁnd fewer good ideas for innovations from external sources, leav-
ing them no choice but to invest resources in developing ‘leading
edge’ innovations. There are parallels here with catch-up strate-
gies in the private sector, where ﬁrms in developing countries ﬁrst
innovate through imitation while ﬁrms in countries at the tech-
nological frontier develop new technology in-house (Furman and
Hayes, 2004).
Policy-dependent agencies have the poorest performance for
novel service innovations and for beneﬁcial outcomes. Their poorer
performance remains after controlling for contextual factors such
as agency size, geographic area of responsibility and national aver-
age per capita income, and for the use of innovation support
strategies such as innovation groups and training. Their consis-
tently poorer outcome performance is unlikely to be due to biases
in the responses to thequestions on innovationbeneﬁts, since there
is little difference between the three types of agencies for self-
reported negative beneﬁts from service and process/organizational
innovations.
The comparatively lower outcome performance of policy-
dependent agencies could partly be due to their limited innovative
capabilities, but we do not know if this is intentional, for instance
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due to a governance system that limits the innovative capacities
of these agencies, or a management failure to provide innovation
leadership.
Knowledge-scanning agencies are more likely to report posi-
tive beneﬁts from service innovations than bottom-up agencies,
but there is little difference for process/organizational innovations.
The advantage for service innovations could be due to their greater
visibility, with knowledge-scanning agencies able to identify and
adopt veriﬁed best practices in use in other countries.
There are two main results from this study that are relevant to
policies to improve public sector innovation. First, a dependence
on policy drivers, without other methods of supporting innova-
tion, reduces performance, even after controlling for contextual
factors. This is a strong message in support of building the inno-
vative capabilities of public administration agencies. Second, there
is more than one method for improving performance, with both a
knowledge-scanning and a bottom-up strategy improving perfor-
mance compared to the policy-dependent method of innovating.
Which method is most appropriate depends on the context, with a
knowledge-scanning strategy effective in lower income countries
with fewer resourcesanda lessdeveloped innovationculture,while
a bottom-up strategy could be more appropriate in higher income
countrieswith greater resources andahighlydeveloped innovation
culture.
This studyhas several limitationswhichpoint to future research.
The data are limited to public administration agencies within
Europe and consequently the results could differ for other types of
public sector organizations such as schools or hospitals or for non-
European countries. Even within public administration agencies,
there could be differences by function that could not be exam-
ined using the Innobarometer data. Second, this is the ﬁrst study
to attempt to identify different innovation methods among agen-
cies. The results need to be veriﬁed using other data sets. Third, the
results indicate that agencies tend to either rely on the expertise of
managers and staff or rely on the expertise of external stakehold-
ers and users. This provides no evidence in support of Sorensen
and Torﬁng’s (2012) vision of a ‘networked’ agency that innovates
using both methods. However, the failure of this study to iden-
tify networked agencies could be due to the use of data with a
large number of knowledge-scanning agencies from lower income
countries, which inﬂuences the factor analysis. The application of
similar analyticalmethods to survey data for high income countries
such as the United States, Australia or Scandinavia might iden-
tify networked agencies. Fourth, research is required to provide
deeper insights into drivers that could inﬂuence managerial and
staff involvement in innovation, such as the effect of salaries, con-
tractual requirements or professional values (Sorensen andTorﬁng,
2012) in motivating managers and staff to implement methods to
improve innovative capabilities and performance.
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